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1‘The Party’s Over’:  Critical Junctures, Crises and the Politics of 
Housing Policy
Abstract
The key argument set out in this article is that historical and comparative 
forms of investigation are necessary if we are to better understand the 
ambitions and scope of contemporary housing interventions.  To demonstrate 
the veracity of our claim we have set out an analysis of UK housing polices 
enacted in the mid 1970s as a basis for comparison with those pursued forty 
years later. The article begins with a critical summary of some of the 
methodological approaches adopted by researchers used to interpret housing 
policy. In the main section we present our critical analysis of housing policy 
reforms (implemented by the Labour government between 1974 and 1979) 
noting both their achievements and limitations. In the concluding section, we 
use our interpretation of this period as a basis to judge contemporary housing 
policy and reflect on the methodological issues that arise from our analysis. 
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2Introduction
Amongst the reasons for writing this article is our commitment to extending 
the reach of analysis to better judge contemporary housing policymaking.  In 
our view, many accounts of housing policy are; either too narrowly focussed 
on administrative interventions (e.g. More et al, 2005) or, overly structural in 
scope, dismissing domestic policy reform as of little consequence compared 
to the effects of global capital and neoliberal ideology (e.g. Harvey, 2010). We 
suggest that amongst the best ways to respond to the limitations of 
contemporary critiques of housing policy is to pursue more historical and 
comparative forms of analysis. To support our argument, we revisit the mid 
1970s in the UK (analysing the policies of the early years1 of  the 1974-1979 
Labour government and focussing on the speeches of one key figure - 
Anthony Crosland) to chart how policymakers addressed contemporary 
housing problems.  We then use our observation of this period as a basis to 
judge subsequent policy interventions2. 
As will be made clear, we are not seeking to pursue a simplistic argument that 
today’s policymakers lack conviction whilst those in the 1970s were more 
resolute. Rather our point here is more nuanced; that policymaking has 
become too attentive to managerial interventions that prioritise demand side 
concerns rather than tackling more fundamental problems of supply. The 
reliance on piecemeal social reform as an appropriate mode of intervention 
reflects shifts in the conduct of policymaking that are difficult to detect on a 
year-by-year basis but are more clearly discernible when comparisons are 
made across two historical periods. The article highlights the way in which 
housing policies have become increasingly constrained due to a variety of 
ideational, political and material processes. Pursuing a historical analysis 
enables an understanding of housing which takes account of both structure 
and agency and acknowledges the ideological and practical barriers to reform.  
Such an analyses sheds light on both the constraints upon and opportunities 
to develop coherent reform strategies. Whilst our study has focussed on the 
UK, the issues we explore have relevance to other territories where neoliberal 
practices in housing and welfare reform have taken effect.
Methodological Issues
All forms of research require choices about what to select and what to reject 
as evidence. Influenced by what Pierson (2011) describes as a ‘historic turn’ 
in social science, we have chosen to focus on the mid 1970s UK housing 
policy for a number of reasons. First, that it marked a period of economic 
crisis, at a time when housing issues were at the forefront of public debate. 
Writing at the end of the decade Merrett (1979: 259) contended ‘there has 
probably been no other period in modern British history when the impact of 
1
 As we make clear later on in the article, most of the significant housing legislation was enacted in the 
first few years of their period in office. 
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 The reforms undertaken by the Conservative administration elected in 1979 have been subject to 
considerable interest (see Forrest and Murie 1988, Lowe, 2004, Malpass 2005, Malpass and Victory 
2010). In contrast, the mid 1970s has been been paid less attention in recent housing scholarship. 
3broad macro-economic trends in the sphere of housing has been starker or 
more powerful’. A second reason for selecting this period is that it has often 
been depicted as heralding a critical juncture in housing policy, marking the 
emergence of neoliberalism as a dominant ideology (see Lowe 2004 and 
2011). A third reason is that the era encompassed a considerable body of 
legislative activity relating to housing issues, incorporating a comprehensive 
review of housing finance, established by the government to address a 
number of specific policy challenges. 
Whilst the period is best known for the imposition of severe public expenditure 
cuts, required by the International Monetary Fund, as a condition of a loan to 
the government in 1976, and public sector industrial action in 1979, there was 
considerable interest in and activity surrounding housing issues. Amongst the 
legislation passed was the 1974 Housing Act which established Housing 
Action Areas3 and provided increased funding to and regulation of housing 
associations; the 1974 Rent Act, which extended security of tenure to those 
living in furnished property; the 1975 Housing Rents and Subsidies Act which 
introduced new subsidy arrangements to replace the 1972 Housing Act 
provisions (which increased council rents) and finally the 1977 Housing 
(Homeless Persons) Act which for the first time imposed a statutory obligation 
on local authorities to provide accommodation for homeless households 
(Malpass and Murie (1994:66). Although often seen as a revisionist period of 
welfare retrenchment and heralding the emergence of privatisation and 
deregulation (Malpass and Rowlands, 2010: 2) it is important to remember 
that these processes went hand in hand with an extension of government 
intervention in many aspects of housing policy. We decided further to examine 
the interventions of a key figure in Labour party history of this period (Anthony 
Crosland) and draw from his speeches and writings as the basis for this study.  
We have attended to Crosland primarily because of his contribution to both 
housing policy and wider social democratic thinking at this time. Although his 
tenure as Secretary of State was relatively brief, the development of his 
thinking about (and resolve to implement) housing policy reform provides us 
with an evidential base from which we can consider questions concerning 
both the opportunities and constraints faced by governmental decision-
makers4. 
Literature
There are a number of excellent commentaries and data to draw from, such 
as Government papers (available from the National Archives) that we have 
examined to piece together the period (see for example: Crosland 1974; 
Dunleavy 1981; Foster 2005; Holmans 1987; Jefferys 2000; Malpass 2008; 
3 The designation of Housing Action Areas was largely determined by the extent of disrepair 
in the private rental sector.
4 In attending to Crosland’s contribution we are mindful that we could be criticised for 
attributing too much significance to his role and also perhaps for over emphasising the 
capacity of politicians to exert influence.  Whilst not wishing to exaggerate the importance of 
agency vis à vis other factors: we do adhere to the notion, that in some periods, events and 
circumstances can coalesce in ways that offer politicians opportunities to effect major change.  
The mid 1970s was one such period.
4Malpass and Murie 1998).  Yet as Malpass has observed ‘despite the 
substantial proportion of housing research devoted to aspects of policy, one of 
the less well developed areas of housing studies remains the policy-making 
process itself’ (Malpass 2008:65). There are discernible reasons why this 
neglect has arisen. The policymaking process is often difficult to fathom 
because of the secrecy that surrounds it and the inclination of those involved 
to present it as a rational process in which effective decisions are arrived at 
through careful deliberation (Malpass and Means 1993).  Two ways to 
surmount these barriers are to interview those involved and ask them to 
reflect on their involvement or alternatively to study an earlier period, drawing 
upon archives and other sources to discern key events and pass judgement 
on the period. In this article we embark on an historical assessment of 
policymaking in order to reflect on similarities and differences in approach 
between two significant periods and to consider what lessons can be gained 
for contemporary policymaking.
As we have stated, our reason for revisiting housing policy in the early 1970s 
is not just an exercise in history per se (see Jacobs 2001 and Cole 2006 for a 
discussion of historical methods) but to use the period as a basis to consider 
the challenges that contemporary housing policymakers confront and the 
constraints that impede reform. Criticising a tendency towards 
decontextualisation in public policy Pierson (2011), amongst others, maintains 
that historically informed investigations constitute an increasingly important 
component in understanding contemporary developments. As Pollitt (2008) 
writes ‘the past cannot be dismissed or discarded, it must be acknowledged 
and negotiated with’ (p.xiii). In our coverage, the questions we ask are: to 
what extent is policymaking increasingly constrained by exogenous factors? 
How far can a specific period be seen as a truly critical juncture for housing 
policy? In what ways were the ambitions of housing policymaking different to 
those that are evident today? We hope to show that an investigation into how 
housing policymakers reacted to an earlier economic crisis, how they 
managed escalating social problems and what kind of housing solutions were 
offered as alternatives, provides us with a new angle to interpret 
contemporary policymaking. 
Housing problems – causes and consequences
Before we embark on an analysis of the period in question, some mention 
should be made of the different explanations that have been used to 
understand housing problems. A common interpretation is to explain the 
emergence of problems as a consequence of administrative failings within 
government itself. Consider, for example, the introduction to a 2008 special 
issue of Housing Studies titled ‘Housing policy in England since 1975’ where 
the editors conclude that there ‘has been a systematic collapse in housing 
policy making’ (Holmans et al 2007: 161). In noting how responsibility for 
housing policy shifted from the Department of the Environment (DoE) to other 
(more influential) agencies such as the Department of Work and Pensions, 
the Treasury and Bank of England, the authors argue that ‘while structural 
issues are being addressed, their implementation remains split between 
departments at an individual level, policies therefore tend to be narrowly 
5conceived’ (p.161).  A similar explanation that a lack of coordination lies 
behind government failure in housing policy is provided by Foster (2005:1), 
who argues that that ‘the structure of government and the public sector has 
become too fragmented to be manageable’. Such analyses have proved 
highly influential and underpinned the neighbourhood renewal strategy 
adopted by the 1997 Labour government, which proposed that problems of 
multiple deprivation in marginalised communities could best be resolved 
through ‘joined up’ or ‘holistic’ government (see for example Social Exclusion 
Unit, 2001). Problems were moreover interpreted as amenable to ‘evidence-
based’ administrative or managerial interventions.
As we hope to make clear, we take issue with the explanation that the failure 
of policymakers to address the causes of long running social problems such 
as homelessness or poverty can be attributed to a lack of coordination across 
government departments.  While improvements in organisation and effective 
leadership are undoubtedly important in public policy, there are other more 
significant factors at play.  Our explanation for the failure to tackle entrenched 
social problems draws upon arguments developed by Loic Wacquant (2009b): 
that much of what constitutes social and housing policy attends to 
‘downstream’ issues when the source of the problems is ‘upstream’. In other 
words, the failure to attend to ‘upstream’ issues such as fiscal redistribution 
and social inequality is attributable to the central role played by financial 
institutions (including the Treasury) in setting the parameters for social 
expenditure alongside a reluctance from policymakers to countenance 
alternative (redistributive) measures or to invest in large scale public sector 
interventions. The constraints imposed by both the Treasury and private 
sector institutions have severely restricted ambitions within other departments 
to attend to structural reform. 
The failure to address the causal factors that accentuate inequality explains 
why housing policy in the UK has, over the last 30 or so years, fallen short in 
addressing social problems and in particular has failed to tackle the chronic 
lack of affordable housing.  We concur with the description of housing policy 
provided by Fitzpatrick and Pawson (2014:597) that UK housing interventions 
have shifted from ‘providing a (permanent) “safety net” to a (temporary) 
ambulance service’, noting how government attends to the symptoms of the 
housing crisis rather than its source.  In the area of housing, this translates to 
a focus on demand side concerns (mainly through provision of targeted 
subsidies to low income households) at the expense of supply side issues 
(such as investment in new public housing stock).  
Political economy
The extent and persistence of housing problems in the UK has led to a 
renewed interest in inequality. Both Dorling (2014) and Meek (2014) argue 
that much government housing policy that endeavours to address the housing 
crisis is in fact a chimera, in which the primary objective is to convince the 
wider public that action is being taken rather than engaging in structural 
reform.  Consequently, there is insufficient political desire or spending 
commitments to address in any meaningful way, contemporary problems such 
6as the shortfall in affordable housing, reform of land taxation or willingness to 
end the tax privileges enjoyed by wealthy homeowners. These issues are 
attended to in Dorling’s (2014) All that is Solid. As well as identifying inequality 
as the most significant causal factor underpinning the current housing crisis, 
Dorling notes how the gap between rich and poor is widening as rents 
increase and speculative investors acquire former public housing stock 
(although Dorling’s analysis concludes that housing problems are 
exacerbated by an inefficient use of stock rather than a supply gap per se).
It is now common to situate housing policy in what can be termed a political 
economy frame (see Aalbers and Christophers 2014). According to this 
analysis, policy is primarily intended to sustain the privileges of affluent 
households; rather than to ameliorate the conditions experienced by 
marginalised communities. Moreover, changes in policy are often seen as a 
response to technological innovations in the productive economy. So for 
example in the mid 1970s, the shift from mass production (assembly lines) to 
new methods of flexible assembly, reliant on technologies that enabled 
production to downscale workforces (Post-Fordism) had a significant impact 
on both the deindustrialisation of urban areas and patterns of socio-spatial 
segregation.  A political economy frame generally underestimates the agency 
accorded to politicians and instead foregrounds the role of ideology as an 
influence on policy change - evoking Marx’s observation in the Critique of 
Political Economy that the ‘mode of production of material life conditions the 
social, political and intellectual life in general’ (see Flew 2014: 57). 
Explanations that emphasise the role of neoliberal ideology on the decisions 
undertaken by government cite as evidence the commitment to reducing 
public expenditure, the restructuring of welfare through increasing 
conditionality and the commitment to competition (see for example, Glynn, 
2009) .  In recent years, the political economy frame has been extended to 
account for the growth in private and corporate landlordism which seeks to 
profit from the rise in residential housing (see Forrest and Hirayama 2015). 
Whilst there is much to be gained from an explanation of housing policy that 
foregrounds the role of ideology, we would suggest that it is insufficient.  
Instead, we concur with Flew who argues (2014:58-59) that such explanations 
cast public policy ‘as essentially the outcome of political struggles external to 
the agencies responsible for it, underpinned by a coherent political ideology 
manifesting itself as a policy program (neoliberalism) held by ruling class 
interests’. The degree to which institutions and actors are able to exert agency 
and make a difference remains a mater of judgement. What we can discern 
from contemporary texts is that the sense of capability was altogether more 
apparent in the statements (and interventions) on housing in the 1970s than in 
an era dominated by mistrust of politics, scepticism about the capacity of 
government and characterised by administrative restructuring and piecemeal 
social reform. To us, these processes suggest a discursive shift in the 
orientation of policymakers that can be attributed to economic changes, 
notably the demise of Fordism and Keynesian inspired politics. To develop 
our argument, we now turn to a discussion of agency.
Understanding agency and path dependency
7As stated in the introduction, amongst the questions we ask is: what scope is 
there for major reform, given structural constraints exerted upon policy 
makers?  Some mention should be made of the explanations that have been 
put forward to address this question5. The most influential of late is the idea of 
‘path dependency’ in explaining the limited capacity for policy makers to 
change course of direction. Key exponents such as Kingdon (1995) argue that 
policy makers tend to change course usually through a combination of 
external disruptions that over time generate a momentum for actors within 
government institutions for reform.  For example, Kay (2005:553) writes that ‘a 
process is path dependent if initial moves in one direction elicit further moves 
in that same direction; in other words, the order in which things happen affects 
how they happen; the trajectory of change up to a certain point constrains the 
trajectory after that point’. However, as North (1990:98) contends policy 
makers also retain a degree of autonomy: ‘at every step along the way there 
are choices…. real alternatives. Path dependence is a way to narrow 
conceptually the choice set and link decision-making through time. It is not a 
story of inevitability in which the past neatly predicts the future’. 
Such path dependent processes have proved significant influences upon 
central government institutions. Thus, within the UK any attempt to progress 
government housing policy change must pay heed to the ‘Whitehall’ culture 
and its’ bearing on Ministers and civil servants. Ethnographic research by 
Rhodes (2011) observing the behaviour of British Ministers in spending 
departments demonstrates how established norms and ‘ways’ of doing things 
shape the capacity of individual ministers and civil servants to pursue a reform 
agenda. Given this context the processes identified as significant by path 
dependency exponents can exert an important constraint upon reform minded 
Ministers, in particular those attempting to counteract prevailing economic 
orthodoxies. Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between those who 
have passively accepted prevailing ideologies and those who have attempted 
to introduce more radical measures. It is our contention that in spite of 
structural constraints, Ministers in the 1974-79 Labour government retained 
substantial agency in their efforts to adhere to social democratic forms of 
politics; such agency was however greatly diminished in later years due to a 
combination of economic contingencies, centre-right neoliberal ideologies, 
pessimism about the capacity for political change and a preference for 
managerialist reform strategies. 
Housing policy in the 1970s
Our discussion thus far has outlined a number of influential frameworks used 
to understand housing policy and provided a justification for adopting an 
historical approach. We now turn to a discussion of the 1970s noting both the 
achievements and failures of this period.  A small but important body of recent 
historical scholarship has explored the politics of this period and considered 
its bearing on subsequent Conservative housing policy enacted in the 1980s 
(ODPM 2005; Gibb and Whitehead 2007; Forrest 2010; Malpass 2005 and 
5 See Malpass (2011) for a discussion of the concept of path dependency and housing policy.
82008; Malpass and Rowlands 2010; Watson and Niner 2010). All of these 
contributions identify how local authority budgetary cuts implemented from the 
mid-1970s in provided an opening for privatisation policies, facilitating a 
reconfiguration of housing problems attributed to individual behaviour, rather 
than a failure of collective provision and accompanied by a (longer term) 
orthodoxy that owner occupation should be the dominant, aspirational tenure. 
‘Local authorities were no longer to be regarded as contributing to the solution 
to housing problems – they had become part of the problem. Henceforth 
housing was to be treated as a commodity and policy was to be framed 
accordingly’ as Malpass explains (2005:210). It was at this time that local 
government also began to be more widely represented as bureaucratic, 
inefficient and self-serving (Power, 1980; Dunleavy, 1981).
We can glean some valuable insights from the above literature. First, it should 
be noted that housing problems were of a different order from those 
experienced in later periods. In the 1970s, house price inflation, high rents 
and disrepair in the private sector were major concerns. Holmans (2005) 
provides some key data: in 1973 the minimum lending rate of the Bank of 
England (interest rate) was set at 13 per cent with building society mortgage 
lending at 11%, a rate which accelerated mortgage famine and housing 
slump. At the same time, as Holmans points out, private sector new starts 
halved between 1973 -1974 and house prices increased by 40% within the 
year (2005: 5-6). Other similarities to the 1970s can also be identified. Studies 
by both Sandbrook (2012) and Beckett (2009) have pointed to obvious 
parallels such as austerity and a small majority or minority government. The 
major difference of course was the level of inflation, at a record high (of 
around 25% in 1975) (Malpass and Rowlands, 2010a, p.3) compared to a 
figure of almost zero recorded in 2015. Moreover, in terms of housing tenure, 
socially rented housing represented a far larger proportion of the total stock 
than subsequently - around 30% of the total stock compared to just over 18% 
in England Wales in 2011 (ONS:2013), local government had greater 
resources and there was a wide acceptance that the major problems of 
housing were not solely attributable to supply, but also disrepair in the private 
rental market and affordability problems (due to high interest rates on 
mortgage payments and high rent levels). Today, of course, other issues loom 
large, for example across the UK as much as £2 billion is expended on 
providing temporary accommodation to over 64,000 homeless households 
(Mathiason, 2015). The number of affordable homes that were built in 2014 
also fell to a seven-year low of 42,870 per annum ensuring the prospects for 
any easing of the crisis are a long way off (ibid.). Table 1 below outlines the 
main comparisons between the two periods.
9Table 1 Housing Context:  1974 and 2015.
Year Inflation, 
public 
spending
Government Shortage 
of housing
Government 
intervention
Unemployment Housing 
conditions
Housing 
tenure
1974 High 
inflation, 
declining 
public 
spending
Very small 
Labour 
majority
Yes Strong Increasing Poor quality 
private rental 
sector, poor 
standard of 
management 
and 
maintenance
Large 
public 
(mainly 
council) 
sector, 
declining 
private 
sector
2015 Low 
inflation, 
minimal 
public 
spending
Small 
Conservativ
e majority
Yes Weak Fragile Low supply, 
housing 
affordability 
concerns.
Declining 
public 
sector, 
large 
private 
rental 
sector
So, the housing landscape in the UK in the 1970s was in many respects 
different to the contemporary period.  As Watson and Niner (2010) argue, 
governments in the 1960s and early 1970s were committed to public sector 
house-building - the Labour government elected in 1964 promised to build 
500,000 dwellings a year for example. There was a willingness to improve the 
stock and a desire to maintain stable relations between central and local 
government.  In contrast, the early 21st century has seen an abandonment of 
many of the central assumptions which had underpinned welfare state 
housing provision, including: the principle of security of tenure; that social 
housing rents should be set at sub-market levels; that residents should not be 
penalised for under-occupation of their property or if they have relatively high 
income levels. Notably, some social housing organisations no longer see their 
main function as providing housing for low-income groups. Wider attitudinal 
changes have underpinned these proposals, marking a much more hostile 
perception towards welfare provision. 
Labour in opposition – Anthony Crosland
Any assessment of Labour’s period in office from 1974 requires some 
background about the previous government’s housing record and this section 
considers how Labour responded to the perceived failures of the earlier 
Conservative government. The main plank of the 1970 Heath government’s 
housing policy had been the 1972 Housing Finance Act that required local 
authorities to charge higher rents that were more in line with the private rental 
market. The idea of these ‘fair’ rents was to reduce the costs of subsidies to 
local authority tenants and the allowances that protected council tenants from 
rent rises. The very poor tenants were eligible for rent rebates.  
Labour in opposition was eager to ensure that housing marked a key point of 
differentiation from the Conservatives. Anthony Crosland had been a central 
figure in shaping Labour thinking following the publication of his influential 
(1956) book, The Future of Socialism. His appointment as shadow Secretary 
of State for the Environment helped to establish the importance of housing in 
Labour social policy and a lecture in 1971 reveals much about this era 
(Crosland 1971). Over forty years later, we can compare the scope and 
ambition of Crosland’s vision with the agenda of contemporary politicians. 
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Crosland starts by stating that ‘in this lecture, I think aloud about housing 
policy – about the principles on which it is based, what went right and what 
went wrong from 1964 to 1970 and how we could do better next time’ 
(Crosland 1971:1). He then proceeds to set out the achievements of the 
Labour government’s earlier period in office (1964-1970) including the 
subsidies that were provided to local authorities to restrict rent levels at a time 
of high inflation.  Labour also offered 100% mortgages for those low-income 
tenants without sufficient funds so they could provide a deposit to purchase a 
home.  By 1970, the percentage of householders in homeownership had 
reached 50% (prefiguring the emergence of owner occupation as the 
dominant tenure) (DoE, 1977b).  Crosland in the same lecture stated how 
improvement grants and the 1965 Rent Act offered security of tenure and fair 
rents.
Some of the most interesting passages include those where Crosland 
provides a diagnosis of the failures of government policymaking, with the 
admission that ‘we did not solve the housing problem, which had for so long 
been underestimated’ (p.2). Amongst the failures were: a drop in house 
building after the peak year of 1968; the slow rate of slum clearance 
programmes; complexity in rent setting with the poorest tenants reliant on 
social security benefits; furnished accommodation remaining outside the 
protection of the Rent Acts; and owner-occupiers receiving hefty subsidy. He 
also made reference to the chronic housing shortage in London. A vacancy 
rate of 2% was considered too low – the figure recommended was around 5% 
to encourage mobility. Much of the stock was considered unfit for habitation; 
the 1976 English House Condition Survey estimated that around three million 
properties (comprising 20% of the housing stock) were either unfit or lacking 
one or more basic amenity (Watson and Niner, 2010, p.25). A third of the 
stock was also built before the war.
Crosland understood the need for ambitious policy interventions to address 
these problems. He stated that in future housing policy should be 
comprehensive and based on multiple objectives (incorporating social service, 
housing, planning, environmental, equity, and economic goals). He firmly 
rejected the notion that council housing should be limited to households in the 
severest need, correctly acknowledging that this would effectively relegate the 
sector to a second class service. As he maintained: ‘A Labour housing policy 
must wholly reject the philosophy… that some people “should” be council 
tenants and others owner occupiers, that council houses are only for certain 
categories of person and not for others’ (Crosland, 1974a: 123).  He predicted 
that conservative policy was headed in this direction however, as identified in 
the following comment: ‘The council tenant is an underprivileged citizen…but 
much of it stems from a pervasive feeling, insidiously fostered by the present 
Government, that council housing is meant only for poorer people’ (1974: 129) 
(emphasis in original). At the same time, he rejected what was soon to 
become the orthodox representation of government funded housing: ‘Council 
estates, particularly outside the cramped centres of large cities, are not 
usually the vast, uniform, soulless and segregated places which middle-class 
critics seem to imagine; they are normally well liked and well laid out’ (1974: 
132). This last comment is noticeable in its contrast with subsequent 
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analyses, which tended to portray council housing in unremittingly negative 
terms. For politicians such as Crosland then, State intervention in housing 
provision could still be seen as beneficial and conducive to wider social 
welfare of residents.
Amongst Crosland’s suggestions was a need for more equity in subsidy 
arrangements offered to homeowners and council tenants and an allowance 
for private renters with the caveat that ‘we must of course ensure that the new 
allowance is not a subsidy to landlords and especially bad landlords. There 
must be strict conditions about the fixing of rent and the state of repair.  But 
subject to these, we should welcome the allowance in principle’. (p.15). He 
also suggested that tenants residing in furnished accommodation should be 
able to access the new allowance and he made the case for responding to 
new household formation by building smaller dwellings. 
Of course, there is an obvious risk in taking statements of intent on trust or 
even worse assuming that politicians will realise these goals when in power.  
Therefore, the only reliable test for judging policy is to look at the delivery of 
these intentions. For this reason, we turn our focus on Labour’s period in 
office following their narrow election victories in 19746.
Labour in government
Whilst the 1974-79 Labour government is usually perceived as heralding a 
period which (following the 1976 International Monetary Fund crisis) saw the 
introduction of monetarism and neoliberalism (see Hobsbawm 2013), there is 
evidence that policymakers were in relative terms ambitious in attempting to 
address social problems and most importantly saw financial cuts as a 
temporary phenomenon rather than a long-term political necessity (Foster 
2005). Consequently, in government, the Labour party took steps to 
implement a number of housing reforms. First to assuage Labour local 
authorities, who had strongly opposed the Conservative 1972 Housing 
Finance Act, the new government imposed a rent freeze on councils. 
Subsides were made available in the Housing Act 1974 to housing 
associations and local authorities to rehabilitate private properties in disrepair 
and the 1975 Housing Rent and Subsidies Act provided grant to local 
authorities who took out loans for housing renewal and maintenance. In 1976, 
the Labour government also commenced a review of the Rent Acts with a 
remit to increase supply.
The establishment of a Housing Finance Review in 1975 provides further 
evidence that the government was committed (in principle at least) to 
progressive housing reform. In the House of Commons, Crosland announced 
the review as a ‘searching and far-reaching inquiry into housing finance, to get 
beyond a housing policy of ‘ad hoc-ery’ and crisis management, and to find 
out precisely what needs to be done if we are to get on top of this desperate 
6
 Heath lost power in February 1974 despite having a larger share of the vote than the Labour party. 
Wilson returned to office though 17 seats short of an overall majority. In a second election in October 
1974, Wilson secured a small overall majority of 3 seats.
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social problem once and for all’ (Housing of Commons Debates, Vol. 881, 
November 1974, col 914 - quoted by Malpass 2008: 67).
Alongside the review of finance, the government had to attend to pressing 
housing challenges identified by the party while in opposition.  Crosland relied 
on his junior minister (John Silkin) to focus on land taxation issues and there 
was also a need to pacify Labour councillors who had deliberately broken the 
law by not raising rents (famously including those imprisoned in Clay Cross in 
Derbyshire). An amnesty was therefore granted for councillors who refused to 
increase rents as prescribed by the Conservatives in the 1972 Housing 
Finance Act.
Perhaps the most significant component of the 1974 Housing Act was the 
financial support made available to housing associations to develop new 
stock, as hitherto government funds had primarily been directed towards local 
authorities. The support for voluntary organisations paved the way for a more 
diverse social housing sector and a major initiative of the Labour government 
was to introduce housing improvement areas providing grants to local 
authorities and housing associations to tackle disrepair in the private sector. 
As Gulliver (2014) pointed out, in contrast to the current era, government 
interventions at this juncture, were still largely focussed on supply side issues 
rather than relying on subsidising households through rebates and benefits. 
These interventions were important, but external factors were to prove more 
compelling and the deficit in revenue that engulfed the Labour government in 
the mid 1970s (following the OPEC oil crisis) created a mounting sense of 
crisis within Whitehall.  Yet, as we have noted, the austerity measures 
undertaken were seen as temporary. A much (and selectively) quoted speech 
by Crosland (by now Secretary of State for the Environment) illustrates this 
point clearly. 
For the next few years times will not be normal. Perhaps people have 
used the words 'economic crisis' too often in the past. They have 
shouted 'wolf, wolf' when the animal was more akin to a rather 
disagreeable Yorkshire terrier. But not now. The crisis that faces us is 
infinitely more serious than any of the crises we have faced over the 
past 20 years...With its usual spirit of patriotism and its tradition of 
service to the community's needs, it is coming to realize that, for the 
time being at least, the party is over...We are not calling for a headlong 
retreat. But we are calling for a standstill (Crosland, speech at 
Manchester Town Hall, 9 May, 1975).
The impact of the subsequent cuts imposed was particularly damaging for 
local authority building programmes with the number of new properties 
constructed reducing from a high of 110,000 in 1975 to 49,000 in 1979 (Lund 
2006:36). This reduction was particularly significant as in contrast to later 
periods, there was no expectation that private landlordism was a viable 
alternative. The precarious aspects of renting and the poor condition of many 
inner city properties probably informed a speech Crosland delivered in 1975 in 
which he stated ‘I do not believe there is a long-term future for the privately 
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rented sector in its present form’ (Speech in Eastbourne, 20 November, 
1975).  The background to the antipathy towards the private sector was of 
course the legacy of the Rachman7 era and a recognition of the serious 
disrepair within the sector (Simmonds, 2002). 
Crosland became Foreign Secretary in April 19768 and was replaced by Peter 
Shore.  Accounts of his time in office suggest that housing policy was a less 
pressing issue for Shore during his period as Minister. As Malpass (2008:71) 
writes ‘Shore has often been seen as adopting a conservative stance on 
housing’ by signalling support for homeownership and resisting calls to 
address the inequities produced by maintaining mortgage interest tax relief for 
home buyers.  His time at the Department of the Environment also coincided 
with Treasury demands to make significant cuts to local authority housing 
expenditure9. One significant success was in passing the 1977 Housing 
(Homeless Persons) Act which proved to be a major landmark in attempting to 
tackle the problem of homelessness (although introduced as a Liberal MP’s 
Private Members Bill and passed with government support in the Commons). 
The introduction of a statutory duty upon local authorities to respond to 
homelessness illustrated how the State was able to intervene effectively in 
local level decisions to the benefit of disadvantaged households (see for 
example Anderson, 2004).
Assessment
Despite the important initiatives outlined above, the Labour government 
inevitably confronted severe external constraints in implementing a 
progressive housing programme.  In particular, there was a weakening of 
policy intent due to pragmatic electoral considerations, most notably the 
failure to address the cost and ineffectiveness of ‘Mortgage Interest Relief at 
Source’ (MIRAS). As Watson and Niner (2010) argue, Labour policymakers 
were reluctant to tackle the problems of MIRAS, which increased from £2.18 
billion in 1975-6 to £4.19 billion in 1980/1 (Stephens et al 2005:20) for fear of 
the electoral consequences. 
The verdict on Labour’s housing record is mixed. Opposition to the 1972 
Housing Finance Act was seen as a contributory factor in the 1974 General 
Election results but as Malpass (2005: 103) comments this was ‘surely the 
last time housing, especially council housing would help Labour into office’. 
The Housing Finance Review, which was not published until 1977 (after 
Crosland’s death) has been described as ‘very conservative’ (Balchin and 
Rhoden, 2002: 99) and an ‘insipid document’ (Harloe, 1978). However, 
despite the considerable disappointment engendered by this document, it is 
evident that there was a determination (under Crosland) to effect change, 
7
 Peter Rachman was a private landlord based in west London. In the late 1960s, he became infamous 
for his harassment of sitting tenants to gain vacant possession. 
8
 Harold Wilson resigned as Prime Minister in April 1976 and was succeeded by the Foreign Secretary 
James Callaghan. 
9This noted, Shore was responsible for the 1977 Government White Paper ‘Policies for the 
Inner Cities’ (DoE 1977a) which identified the structural causes of poverty and the need for 
public sector intervention to address its effects.
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although the government was frustrated by economic circumstances. A 
housing bill was put to parliament in 1979 under the auspices of Peter Shore, 
but it was never passed, when Labour lost the election in May.
Crosland’s time at the Department of the Environment (DoE) has been the 
subject of considerable commentary with Foster (2006: 80-81) noting that ‘the 
department’s sheer size and scope would have defeated the most energetic 
and determined minister’.  Foster writes that more effective legislation was 
prevented ‘because of pressure of Cabinet and urgent departmental business 
– and also his preferred methods of working - he would not spare enough time 
for progress meetings to steer it to avoid getting bogged down in official 
conservatism’ (p. 81). Foster’s analysis suggests that the explanation for the 
failure of policy is located in the institutional structure of government decision-
making. In contrast, we argue that these constraints need to be seen in 
conjunction with a wider economic context, characterised by fiscal 
conservatism and short-term electoral calculations. In this instance these 
were sufficient factors to overcome the individual or collective political will. 
The present era
In seeking comparisons between historical periods it is important to note that 
the current housing agenda is quite distinct, not least because there has been 
a sustained period of welfare restructuring and retrenchment, on the pretext of 
reducing the structural deficit arising from the 2007/8 global financial crisis 
(GFC). In addition, a number of further differences can be identified between 
the Crosland and the contemporary era, the cumulative impact of which has 
been to transform the landscape for housing policy. First, a ‘rightward tilting of 
the bureaucratic field’ (Wacquant, 2012, p.73), has seen the State assisting 
those at the top whilst castigating those at the bottom. The punitive 
management of poverty as a component of neoliberalism (Wacquant, 2009) 
has been abetted by a shift in public attitudes towards welfare, incorporating 
declining support for social security spending and increasingly negative 
perceptions of disadvantaged groups (Clery, Lee and Kunz, 2013). Politicians 
have become increasingly reluctant to express support for welfare provision in 
general and social rented housing in particular, facilitating a redefinition of 
‘affordable housing’ to include near (rather than sub) market rents and 
subsequently including low-income home ownership. 
Changes to housing tenure provide a very different social context to the 
1970s. As the supply of public housing has diminished, the private rented 
sector has played an increasingly important role in meeting housing need; by 
2012 in England it housed 3.8m households compared to two million in 2001 
(Smith, Albanese and Truder, 2014, p.10). By 2015 the private rented sector 
housed a third of people in poverty, compared to a fifth a decade previously 
(MacInnes et. al., 2015) and is regularly used to accommodate homeless 
households (Fitzpatrick et. al., 2013). With low-income groups increasingly 
housed in a private rented sector, despite its lower security and standards of 
repair (Smith, Albanese and Truder, 2014) the notion of the social rented 
sector as the main vehicle to meeting housing need has been further 
undermined. 
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Institutionally, the emergence of multi-level governance has introduced an 
additional layer of complexity. The devolution of policy since 1999 now means 
that governments can no longer pursue a UK-wide housing strategy and 
policy makers face a radically transformed institutional landscape (see 
Maclennan and O’Sullivan 2013). As different territories have developed 
distinctive patterns of governance and policy responses, the variegated 
initiatives offered limit the scope for governments to respond to common 
problems. This fragmentation of governance, accompanied by an increasing 
influence of private sector providers in public policy (Crouch, 2009; Meek, 
2014), radically restricts opportunities to develop innovative strategies, 
regardless of other resource pressures. 
The overall consequence of these developments is that a restructuring of 
housing has been accompanied by an assertion by policymakers that the 
modernisation and localism of delivery are the prime components in improving 
service provision. Consequently, policy has been delivered through piecemeal 
interventions, which have occluded the conflicts that arise when determining 
spending priorities. Whilst the 1970s saw a combination of events which 
frustrated decision making, subsequent periods have seen policies presented 
as wholly pragmatic interventions, based on an evidence base ostensibly free 
from ideological bias. As has been argued elsewhere the concept of 
‘evidence-based policy’ is highly problematic (see for example Jacobs and 
Manzi, 2013), introducing new modes of governance, removed from the 
political arena and resting on a flawed concept of ‘depoliticisation’ (Flinders 
and Buller, 2006). Contemporary welfare reform, despite variations in 
approach within UK territories, can be therefore be viewed as a form of what 
Raco (2009) terms ‘existential politics’ founded on individual ‘aspiration’, 
managed by the state, rather than a politics based on collective expectations 
of improvement. 
For us, the new politics of housing are represented by a profound discursive 
shift, in tone, emphasis and content. The differing responses to economic 
crisis therefore offer a stark contrast. Whilst in one period, the imposition of 
public spending restrictions was seen as a necessary, albeit undesirable 
measure, later periods have seen a reduction in State intervention as a moral 
good. The occlusion of the political has enabled comprehensive (and largely 
retrogressive) housing and welfare reforms to be implemented with minimal 
opposition. Thus far, governments have been successful in achieving 
substantive reductions in welfare expenditure through the establishment of 
conditionality rules, punitive sanctions for under-occupation in the social 
rented sector and benefit caps.  These initiatives are presented as 
economically, morally and politically desirable, reflecting increasingly 
unsympathetic public attitudes towards benefit recipients.  The language of 
policymaking is thus situated within a transformed terrain, informed by 
managerialist imperatives and underpinned by an ideology of neoliberalism10. 
10
 See Lazzarato’s (2011) argument that contemporary neoliberal governmental practice 
relies on a logic of debt resulting in a transformation of social rights, with beneficiaries of 
16
The state is therefore identified as a constraint on progress and public 
housing presented as uniquely problematic: ‘It was more government that got 
us into this mess’ as Cameron (2009) argued prior to the 2010 election. 
Social housing can therefore without contradiction be portrayed as reinforcing 
‘inequality and social division in society’ (CSJ, 2008:7) rather than assisting in 
the reduction of social deprivation. The wide currency afforded to such 
comments reveals a stark contrast with the Crosland era, when government 
intervention could still be largely seen as benevolent.  The perception of social 
housing as a ‘place of intergenerational worklessness, hopelessness and 
dependency’ (Duncan Smith, 2011) signifies a very sharp departure from the 
language of an earlier generation of policy makers who rejected the 
assumption that the tenure was intrinsically flawed. Attitudes have hardened, 
austerity is accepted as ineluctable and policy measures therefore attend to 
managerial rather than structural interventions. Yet as writers such as 
Anderson (2004) have argued, the imposition of neoliberal inspired policies is 
neither inevitable nor global in scope.  
Conclusion
What conclusions can we draw from the analysis undertaken in this article. 
First, governments in the 1970s retained a commitment to increasing the 
stock of public housing. As Holmans (2005:2) comments ‘1975 was among 
the last days of the environment for council housing that has existed since 
1945, the “Indian Summer” of what appears in retrospect to some as the 
“golden age’ of local authority housing’.  In their pursuit of housing reforms, 
the government acknowledged that additional resources were necessary to 
address policy challenges. Whilst the 1977 Housing Policy Review was widely 
criticised for being insufficiently radical, Holmans is right to claim that ‘its 
virtue lay in demonstrating that there was no set of reforms to be had that 
would deliver better housing to more households at lower cost to the public 
purse without there being a large number of losers; and that no simple local 
authority subsidy system could be devised which would cope inexpensively 
with economic conditions like those experienced in the first half of the 1970s’ 
(Holmans 2005:6).
Second, a modification is required in respect of the orthodox explanation that 
the roots of neoliberal housing policy can be attributed to the IMF crisis of 
1976; rising inflation and mass unemployment. The mid 1970s was an 
important but not necessarily irreversible turning point in UK social policy. 
Rather it can be seen as a period where the collective faith in the institutions 
of the state to deliver a more equitable housing system was still in large part 
evident. The financial crisis that engulfed the Conservative and Labour 
administrations in the 1970s was therefore addressed in a quite different way 
to that which followed the GFC of 2007/8. There were of course failures to 
address major issues. The ambitious proposals set out in the 1970s were 
substantially watered down (e.g. reducing MIRAS) as practical short-term 
welfare turned into debtors. This form of ‘patrimonial individualism’ (p.104) has enabled a 
moralisation of the unemployed as debt has become a universal power relation.
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political considerations took effect but this should not detract from the 
achievements made. Crosland’s observation is still relevant today, 
The intelligentsia, always prone to the liberal rhetoric of catastrophe, 
has adopted an apocalyptic mood, denying (against the facts) that 
reformist progress can be made and believing in any case that 
ecological disaster is just over the horizon (Crosland 1974:53).
Finally, in respect of methodology if we are to understand, in more prescient 
ways, the contemporary failure of British housing policy and the agency of 
governments, it is instructive to return to periods such as this for comparison. 
As Mahoney and Thelen (2010: xi) note important changes in policy take 
place through small, incremental adjustments which cumulatively and over 
time amount to significant transformation. Institutional change is often slow, 
piecemeal and subtle and wider social changes can therefore be identified 
though historical analysis (see Bell 2011 and Pierson, 2011). By contrasting 
the two periods it is evident that nowadays, there is a vastly lower expectation 
about the efficacy of government to reform housing policy as the State’s role 
in welfare has increasingly diminished. Policymakers now face a transformed 
political, institutional and socio-economic environment in which the 
opportunities to present a progressive reform agenda are increasingly 
constrained. The result is a focus on demand side measures and managerial 
interventions in service provision rather than supply and fundamental social 
reform. 
And yet the similarities between the two eras are also instructive, including a 
sense of housing crisis with speculators able to make use of housing as a 
vehicle for wealth creation and in the process curbing opportunities for low-
income households to acquire a home. We would concur with Aalbers and 
Christophers (2014) that the mid 1970s can still be seen as Fordist in that the 
most effective policy response remained the production of new council 
homes. For contemporary policymakers, in contrast spending shortfalls are 
now seen as a more or less permanent feature of the policy landscape rather 
than a temporary phenomenon before normal politics can resume.  As Jessop 
(2013:134) has observed ‘Crises are multifaceted phenomena that invite 
multiple approaches from different entry points and standpoints’. Amongst the 
lessons we can learn from the mid 1970s is that a different housing policy 
agenda is not beyond our reach.
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